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ABSTRACT 
Five principles of skill acquisition are presented based on a review of research on human learning and 
expertise. Essentially these principles state that practice leads to faster and more efficient uses of 
knowledge. This enables faster performance and results in less demand on mental resources. In turn these 
outcomes enable higher level behaviours to be attempted. Ultimately skills are developed through 
refinement of many component processes. A theory of the mind is proposed that borrows from theories of 
complex adaptive systems. In this theory, the mind is conceived of as consisting of agents that compete for 
resources associated with processing information. The nature of this competition is similar to that observed 
in physical and biological systems in that agents survive or disappear depending on their usefulness. This 
theory is shown to be capable of explaining the five principles of skill acquisition, without these principles 
being explicitly built into the theory. Implications for other theories of skill acquisition are considered.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 In the field of Cognitive Psychology most 
explanations of cognitive phenomena involve the 
proposal of systems without any consideration for the 
origins of these systems. We consider this to be a problem 
for the field because such attempts at explanations can be 
considered to be merely re-descriptions of the phenomena. 
An obvious solution to this problem, then, is that the 
origins of systems should always be considered and in 
the case of human cognition, we suggest that learning 
should play a central role in the development of 
cognitive systems. This paper represents a proposal for 
how a complex systems approach can provide an account 
for how humans learn and how cognition can develop 
through experience with the world. 
 The paper is divided into several sections. In the 
first section we describe five principles of learning that 
we have identified from research into human skill 
acquisition. We then propose a theory of how the mind 
develops-the Component Theory of Skill Acquisition-
that adopts complex systems principles proposed by 
Halloy (1998) and Halloy and Whigham (2004). Finally 
we show that such a theory can account for the five 
principles of learning and importantly, without building 
those principles into the theory. 
1.1. Principles of Skill Acquisition 
1.2. Principle 1: Practice Leads to Faster 
Performance 
 Principle 1 is the most obvious feature of learning. 
When something has been learned from a previous 
experience and it can be utilised at some later moment in 
time, performance at that later moment is typically faster 
than previous performance. This principle applies to all 
aspects of behaviour, not just overt behaviour such as 
performance of a task. For instance recognition of 
experiences as familiar is faster as the number of 
recognition attempts increases (Pirolli and Anderson, 
1985). Perception of objects is faster with increased 
experience (Crovitz et al., 1981). It is probably not 
unreasonable to suspect that this principle reflects a basic 
characteristic of neural functioning (Altmann et al., 
2004; Barnes, 1979; Bolger and Schneider, 2002). 
 A common explanation for the effect that practice has 
on the speed of performance is that practice leads to faster, 
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more reliable activation of knowledge structures. This effect 
of practice is often referred to as strengthening in theories of 
skill acquisition and memory (Anderson, 1982). That is, as 
access to an item in memory increases, the representation is 
in some way strengthened, which means that it becomes 
easier to access (i.e., access is faster and more reliable) and 
more resistant to forgetting (Anderson, 1983; Pirolli and 
Anderson, 1985). So, another version of Principle 1 is that 
practice leads to strengthened knowledge structures. When 
performance relies on access to memory representations, the 
greater the strength of those representations, the faster will 
be the performance. 
 An important feature of the way in which 
performance speed improves with learning is that it is 
negatively accelerated. That is, performance 
improvements are typically dramatic early in practice 
and taper off as practice increases until some asymptote 
is reached. There is a great deal of debate as to the 
particular mathematical function that best describes this 
pattern of improvement. For instance, many people claim 
that learning curves are best described by power 
functions-the so-called power law of practice (Anderson, 
1982; Logan, 1988; Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981). 
Others suggest that exponential functions provide a 
better description of learning curves (Heathcote et al., 
2000; Josephs et al., 1996; Rosenbloom and Newell, 
1987). There are even suggestions that learning curves 
represent summaries of several component learning 
curves that each vary in their form (Heathcote et al., 
2000). For our current purposes it is not important which 
function provides the best description of a learning 
curve. Only the negatively accelerated feature of learning 
curves is crucial for our argument. 
1.3. Principle 2: Practice Leads to Efficiencies in 
Knowledge Access 
 According to Principle 1, practice leads to faster 
performance. As mentioned above, one of the reasons for 
this is that repeated access to memory representations 
strengthens these representations and this facilitates 
further access, which in turn facilitates performance that 
relies on this access. Another reason why practice leads 
to improved performance speed is what we identify as 
Principle 2: When people practice a task, the way in 
which they perform the task changes. Typically practice 
leads to a more efficient form of processing. This gain in 
efficiency can be characterised as a move from beginner 
level performance, which involves some deliberation 
about what responses are required, to mastery level 
performance, which is marked by immediate recognition 
of a situation and knowing the appropriate responses. 
 There are a number of different theories as to how 
practice leads to this sort of improvement in the 
efficiency of processing. According to the ACT theory 
(Anderson, 1982; Anderson and Lebiere, 1998), 
improvement in processing is a result of practice leading 
to a reduction in the number of processing steps through 
either deleting unnecessary processing steps or 
collapsing a number of simple processing steps into 
fewer more complicated processing steps that have the 
same effect as the original steps. The proponents of the 
SOAR theory (Newell, 1990) make similar claims. 
According to the Instance theory (Logan, 1988), the 
efficiency of processing is improved by moving from a 
situation where processing steps are executed in a serial 
manner to another situation where stimulus conditions 
trigger the appropriate response without any intervening 
deliberation. In other words, where people may 
originally engage in a process of generating a solution to 
a problem, eventually with practice, when the same 
problem is presented the appropriate solution is retrieved 
directly from memory. 
 Although the various theories propose different 
means by which practice leads to more efficient 
processing, all of the theories lead to the same 
prediction: With sufficient practice of a task where the 
stimulus-response relationship is consistent, performance 
will eventually reach the stage where perception of a 
known stimulus will trigger an automatic response (i.e., 
seeing “3 x 4 = ?” will automatically lead to a response 
of “12”). It is clear that moving from a situation where 
several processing steps are required before a response is 
generated to a situation where a stimulus invokes a 
response automatically will result in considerable savings 
in the amount of time to perform the task. But this process 
does not only save time. One view of the result of this 
process is that people are able to make use of 
consistencies in the world to set up short cuts in the ways 
in which they deal with the world. A problem and all of its 
associated stimuli, goals and processing steps necessary to 
lead to a response, can be represented mentally in a 
compressed form, much like a shorthand version of a word.  
 Research on expertise is full of examples where the 
acquisition of expert knowledge is accompanied by a 
change in the way the domain of expertise is perceived. 
Experts perceive particular configurations of stimuli like 
most people recognise words. That is, the configurations 
are recognised automatically as meaningful and 
depending on the goal of processing, may be relevant to 
decisions about appropriate responses. In contrast, 
novices behave like someone who is learning to read and 
is just able to recognise that certain visual patterns (e.g., 
letters and letter combinations) are relevant to this task. 
That is, novices are typically barely able to recognise as 
relevant components of those configurations that experts 
automatically appreciate as a whole. The clearest 
example of this feature of expertise comes from the 
domain of chess. A common memory task that is used to 
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examine expertise differences in chess involves 
presenting people with a chess board and a configuration 
of pieces that corresponds to some point in the middle of 
a game. Exposure to this configuration is usually 
restricted to a few seconds. The board is then covered up 
and the subject’s task is to reproduce the configuration 
on another board. Accuracy in this task is a direct 
reflection of chess expertise. Novices can typically 
reproduce 33% of a configuration. Players of an 
intermediate standard can reproduce 49% and players of 
the Grand Master level can reproduce 81% (Chase and 
Simon, 1973). Importantly, these differences in accuracy 
are not observed when players are presented with 
random configurations of pieces. The usual explanation 
for these results is that, as players gain expertise, they 
learn to associate certain configurations of pieces with 
the state of the game. For instance, there are attack 
configurations that pose danger for the opposition’s 
queen and there are defence configurations designed to 
protect the king. So, the acquisition of chess expertise is 
associated with the ability to automatically recognize 
particular meaningful configurations of chess pieces. 
Evidence for this view comes from the fact that when 
players are observed attempting to reproduce mid-game 
configurations in the memory task, novices tend to 
position pieces in groups that typically are related in 
superficial ways, such as they all appeared in the same 
region of the board, or they all had the same colour. In 
contrast, chess masters positioned pieces in groups that 
corresponded to meaningful configurations (e.g., attack, 
defence). These configurations were not restricted to 
pieces of the same colour or the same region of the 
board but would involve pieces of both colours that 
may have been positioned some distance from each 
other. Thus chess experts appear to be “reading” a 
chessboard in terms of groups of pieces that correspond 
to meaningful configurations-indeed they may even 
have names for these configurations (e.g., “The Nimzo-
Indian Defence”, “The King’s Gambit” and “The Giuco 
Piano- see Kasparov, 1985). 
 Many other domains (e.g., viewing X-Ray slides of 
the human body: Lesgold et al., 1988; physics problems: 
Larkin, 1983; photographs of basketball games: Allard 
and Burnett, 1985; memory for plays in sport: Allard and 
Stakes, 1991) reveal the same sorts of perceptual 
differences between experts and novices. Such research 
on expertise has a number of features in common. 
Experts ‘see’ things differently to novices. This 
difference in perception appears to be related to the 
ability to identify configurations of stimuli as 
representing meaningful wholes rather than as groups of 
individual stimuli. These configurations are meaningful 
because they are related to the purpose of the processing 
they perform in their domain of expertise. That is, after 
years of experience in a domain and years of practice 
performing particular tasks, certain configurations of 
stimuli automatically trigger responses and these 
responses could be in the form of actions, decisions, 
thoughts, or production of a label. Thus the automatic 
response to a stimulus configuration is a large 
component of expert performance. That this feature 
appears to be a characteristic of all areas of expertise 
illustrates the pervasiveness of Principle 2. 
1.4. Principle 3: Learning Leads to Less Demand 
on Working Memory 
 The combination of Principles 1 and 2 can be 
considered as comprising a third principle. The ability to 
recognise groups of stimuli as meaningful and to do so 
automatically, results in a freeing up of mental resources. 
In particular, working memory is often described as being 
limited in capacity such that it can only hold a certain 
number of items at any time (e.g., 7 ± 2 items according to 
Miller, 1956). Principle 3 states that learning will lead to a 
situation whereby this capacity limit can be circumvented. 
For example, if an English speaker is presented briefly 
with the following set of letters: 
 
uremfolta 
 
and then asked to recall them, they might have difficulty 
remembering all of the letters, particularly in the correct 
order. If the letters were rearranged, however, into the 
following order: 
 
formulate 
 
memory for the set of letters is likely to be far more 
accurate. With the first set of letters, there are nine 
separate pieces of information, a number that may 
exceed most people’s working memory capacity. In the 
second set, however, because we recognise the letters as 
together forming a word, the nine pieces of information 
can be processed as one piece of information. In this 
way, working memory will only contain one piece of 
information-a pointer to an item in our long term 
memory for words-which means that working memory 
will have spare capacity for any other information that is 
to be held there. Presumably, then, another six or so sets 
of letters that are similarly arranged into words could be 
held in working memory without seriously affecting the 
ability to recall them. In this way we could conceivably 
recall 63 letters or more (i.e., 7 words at 9 letters each) 
without too much trouble. Thus, we are able to make use 
of our knowledge of words to apparently circumvent the 
normal capacity limits on working memory. This 
phenomenon is often referred to as ‘chunking’ in the 
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memory literature (Baddeley, 1990; Miller, 1956). It 
refers to the ability to interpret information in 
meaningful chunks and it is the chunks that make up the 
limited number of items of information that can be held 
in working memory. 
 According to Principle 3, then, learning within a 
particular domain often leads to the ability to 
automatically process information in that domain in 
ways that result in fewer demands on working memory. 
An everyday example of this principle in operation is the 
use of acronyms, such as ASIO, CIA, STM and RAM. 
Acronyms represent small sets of letters that correspond 
to the first letter of each word in a set of words (i.e., 
ASIO for Australian Security Intelligence Organisation). 
Thus a smaller number of letters can be used in place of 
a larger set. After sufficient experience with an acronym, 
the acronym can take on the meaning of the set of words 
it represents. Thus seeing “ASIO” will invoke the same 
associations as “Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation” but without the necessity to process four 
words. Thus small numbers of letters can represent much 
larger sets of letters. In this way less information is 
processed and more cognitive resources are available to 
process other information. Further motivation for 
adopting this linguistic convention is that it becomes a 
more efficient mode of communication (i.e., less time is 
spent on the same concept) and saves cognitive effort 
(Anderson et al., 1998). 
 The study of expertise has highlighted many areas 
where chunking occurs and where the nature of the 
chunks (size, complexity) is related to the degree of 
expertise attained by an individual. For example, in the 
memory task used to examine the cognitive processing 
associated with playing chess, novices and masters place 
pieces on the board in distinct groups, suggesting they 
have processed particular pieces together and remember 
them as chunks. In addition, novices and masters recall 
the same number of such chunks, suggesting that the two 
groups of players are subject to the same capacity 
constraint on working memory. Importantly, though, the 
number of pieces in each chunk is greater for the masters 
than for the novices (3.8 pieces vs. 2.4 pieces, Chase and 
Simon, 1973). Hence masters can remember a greater 
total number of pieces than novices. A similar 
observation has been made with expert waiters (Ericsson 
and Polson, 1988).  
 Principle 3 has important implications beyond the 
fact that expertise in a domain can result in sometimes 
extraordinary memory skills for information in that 
domain. One of these implications is that, by 
developing a strategy whereby large amounts of 
information can be processed with only a small amount 
of working memory resources, the expert has 
considerably more working memory capacity available 
for other forms of processing than is the case with a 
novice. As a result, the expert is capable of a greater 
level of complexity in their behaviour than the novice. 
This phenomenon we label as Principle 4. 
1.5. Principle 4: As Expertise Increases, Fewer 
Mental Resources are Required to Perform a 
Particular Task, Enabling the Development 
of a Hierarchy Of Skills 
 The first three principles, taken in combination, 
characterise learning as leading to a situation whereby 
more and more of the knowledge that underlies 
performance can be retrieved faster and more reliably as 
expertise increases. As a result an expert has more 
knowledge at their mental fingertips that can be accessed 
quicker than the novice. Furthermore, this increased 
accessibility of expert knowledge frees up mental 
resources for other forms of processing. Certainly this 
characterisation of the attainment of expertise matches 
the common experience that when embarking on a new 
task (e.g., driving a car) we can often feel so 
overwhelmed by the various elements of the task that 
require our attention that we feel as if we cannot do the 
task at all. Eventually, though, with increased 
experience, the task seems to get easier. The task is not 
changing, of course, we are. We slowly gain more of the 
knowledge that is required about how to perform the task 
and our ability to use this knowledge increases. 
Ultimately we reach the stage where the knowledge is 
executed automatically and we can feel as if performing 
the task requires no effort whatsoever. Thus someone 
who has been driving a car for ten years or more 
probably engages so few mental resources for the actual 
operation of the car that they have plenty of resources 
available for increased vigilance on the road (and so are 
involved in fewer accidents than novice drivers, Adams, 
2003) and are capable of performing other tasks while 
driving (e.g., singing along to the radio, conducting 
conversations, planning a new route to avoid a traffic 
jam) that have little impact on the driving task itself. 
Principle 4, then, identifies the fact that as expertise is 
acquired in a domain, more and more mental resources 
become available and so further development of 
behaviours becomes possible. 
 Everyday life is full of examples where increased 
experience with a particular domain or task leads to a 
transition through a hierarchy of skills. Infants who can 
barely comprehend or produce language, or orient 
themselves in three-dimensional space eventually learn 
to communicate with speech and text and may even learn 
to pilot a plane. The distance between novice and expert 
performance in these domains is clearly great, but so is 
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the amount of time and opportunity for practice. The 
amount of improvement on a novel task that can be 
observed in one hour in the laboratory can be anywhere 
from 50-90% (e.g., dropping from 41 seconds per trial to 
15 seconds, Speelman and Kirsner, 2001, Exp.1). Given 
years of practice to master the many components of a 
complex task, vast leaps in performance levels are 
possible. Principle 4 suggests that the acquisition of 
adult-level skills is a matter of learning component skills 
to a level of performance that enables sufficient mental 
resources to be made available for the development of a 
new set of component skills. According to this principle, 
then, complex behaviours should develop in a stage-like 
manner. When component skills are new, resources will 
be used to cope with the demands of the task. As 
component skills improve with practice, a level of 
mastery of the task is reached such that fewer resources 
are required to perform the task. The freeing up of 
mental resources makes possible the performance of 
higher level behaviours, which may require the 
development of a new set of component skills. By 
proposing Principle 4 as a principle of learning, we are 
making the strong claim that the acquisition of skills, 
such as language comprehension and production and 
performance of mathematical operations, from infancy to 
adulthood, should be characterized by clear stages in 
development, not necessarily related to biological 
maturation, where the trajectory is through a hierarchy of 
behaviours, from low level to higher level behaviours, 
where mastery of some behaviours must always precede 
development of other behaviours and performance within 
a stage will be marked by improvement of component 
skills without necessarily any improvement in the overall 
target behaviour. Thus the degree of improvement 
apparent at any point in time will depend on the level of 
granularity of the analysis of behaviour. At a high level, 
improvement may appear discontinuous but at a lower 
level improvement may be gradual but continuous. 
1.6. Principle 5: Mastery in a Domain Involves the 
Application of an Array of Component 
Processes, with Varying Degrees of Specificity 
to Tasks and Contexts. These Processes are 
Recruited in a Manner that Allows for 
Consistent Performance under Stereotypical 
Situations and Flexible Performance Under 
Unusual Circumstances 
 Principle 5 expresses an assumption that underlies the 
previous four principles. That is, many behaviours reflect 
the execution of a vast array of component processes. 
Component processes range from those that are developed 
specifically for the particular behaviour being performed, 
to those that are useful across a broad spectrum of 
behaviours. The extent to which skills are specific to a 
particular context is determined by several factors, but in 
essence, people adapt to a task situation and their skill 
reflects the nature of this situation. According to Principle 
5, then, all behaviours involve a transfer situation, where 
the level of performance is determined by the extent to 
which existing component processes can be recruited and 
new component processes need to be developed for the 
task at hand. Furthermore, the time to perform a task is a 
sum of the time to execute the component processes 
necessary for performance of the task. When performance 
of the task commences, old component processes will be 
some way along their own learning curve and new 
component processes will be at the beginning of their 
particular learning curves. The learning curve exhibited 
for performance of the task, then, will reflect a 
combination of the component learning curves.  
 Some behaviours will involve component processes 
that are applicable across a wide range of domains. 
Reading skills, for instance, are recruited by a vast array of 
tasks facing adults. As a result of at least twenty years of 
reading in a large number of contexts, most adults’ 
reading skills would be just as applicable to reading on a 
computer screen as part of learning document editing 
skills as reading recipes in acquiring cooking skills. Hence 
performance improvements in these behaviours are 
unlikely to be a result of improvements in component 
reading processes (although benefits may well accrue for 
jargon words associated with the particular skill domain). 
Instead, improvements in performance of these behaviours 
are more likely to be the result of refinement of 
component processes that are specific to the particular 
behaviour. That is, the amount of performance 
improvement observed with a task will be a function of 
the amount of improvement that occurs on component 
processes and the relative contribution of well-practiced 
and new component processes to the overall performance. 
1.7. Summary 
 The five principles of learning describe a number of 
features that are general to all forms of skill acquisition. 
Essentially these principles state that practice leads to 
faster and more efficient uses of knowledge. This enables 
faster performance and results in less demand on mental 
resources. In turn these outcomes enable higher level 
behaviours to be attempted. Ultimately skills are developed 
through refinement of many component processes. 
2. COMPLEX SYSTEMS IN HUMAN 
COGNITION 
 As they have been described above, the five 
principles of learning do not necessarily imply the 
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operations of a complex system. It is other evidence of 
human cognitive performance that suggests to us that 
complex systems underlie human cognition. As has been 
noted in a large number of contexts, within distributions 
of words in individual vocabularies (Zipf, 1949) and in 
print sources (Le et al., 2002), there is a power function 
relationship between a word’s frequency of occurrence 
and the rank of this frequency value in comparison to 
other words. This relationship, known as Zipf’s Law 
(Adamic, 2000), refers to the size of occurrence of an 
event relative to its rank i. The law asserts that the size of 
the i’th largest occurrence of an event is inversely 
proportional to its rank and that this relationship is a 
power function. In English, or any other language for 
that matter, it follows that the terms with the highest 
frequency will occupy the smallest classes, whereas the 
terms with the lowest frequency will occupy the largest 
classes. Quantitatively, the law asserts that: 
 
Pi = P1 i
−α
 
 
 
where, α ≈ 1 and P1 is the probability of the most 
frequent word. The relationship can also be expressed 
in terms of the number of words in each word 
frequency class. Thus, for English, there might be just 
one word in the range 1,000-10,000 occurrences per 
million, but 50,000 words in the range 1-10 
occurrences per million.  
 Zipf-like power functions have been reported for a 
variety of inanimate as well as animate phenomena. An 
illustrative list includes the size of earthquakes, the scale 
of forest fires and the height of sand-hills. Zipf-like 
functions have also been reported for complex social 
phenomena such as city size, the distribution of 
professions and the magnitude of stock market crashes. 
In addition, the list can be extended to include income 
distribution and visitors to internet sites. The ubiquity of 
these functions (which includes Pareto’s law) introduces 
a particularly challenging question. Do they reflect some 
artifactual process involving the law of probabilities, or 
do they reflect an as yet unidentified principle that stands 
above the distinctions between the organisation of 
animate, inanimate and social systems? The most 
parsimonious approach to this problem involves the 
assumption that several descriptive and modeling levels 
must be involved and that convergence can be expected 
at only the highest level, if at all (Halloy and Barratt, 
2007). Consider for example recent work on genomic 
properties. Luscombe et al. (2002) noted that frequency 
of occurrence of the generalized molecular parts 
associated with genomes followed the power law with a 
few parts occurring many times and most parts occurring 
only a few times. Luscombe et al. (2002) attributed these 
patterns to a DNA duplication process as genomes 
evolved to their present state. It might be appropriate to 
hypothesize that while this explanation involves the 
same general principle as that which applies to the Zipf-
like functions for words, the relevant explanations must 
involve different physical material. They involve 
different domains and the critical question concerns the 
presence or otherwise of a single over-arching principle, 
a principle that could be applied to both the animate and 
inanimate domains while protecting the assumption that 
they enjoy distinct physical mechanisms.  
 Halloy advanced a model that reflects this point of 
view (Halloy, 1998). Halloy’s argument includes 
reference to evidence involving the evolution of both 
animate and inanimate systems and employs an over-
arching principle to account for the ubiquity of Zipf-like 
functions. Complex adaptive systems, according to 
Halloy, consist of agents that are made up of particles. 
Agents compete with each other for resources. Particles 
are the basic unit of resource for which agents compete. 
Agents can grow in size because they have been able to 
attract more particles, or they can split to create two or 
more smaller agents. According to Halloy (1998, p.5), 
“The abundance distributions of agents tends to a power 
function with increasing slope toward the right in a log-log 
rank abundance relation or a lognormal.” But the term 
‘tend’ is critical. Halloy adopts the further assumption 
that “natural systems will approximate to log-normal 
models when left to their internal mechanisms, while 
distancing themselves from the log-normal when 
pressured by external forces” (Halloy, 1998, p.3), an 
assumption that “circumvents the debate on the 
appropriate mathematical distributions to fit to natural 
systems” (Halloy, 1998, p.3). Nonetheless, the lognormal 
distribution in a frequency-abundance context is “…a 
signature of complex systems.” (Halloy, 1998, p.2).  
 It is on the basis that features of distributions of words 
in individual and cultural lexica are consistent with 
abundance distributions associated with the operation of 
complex adaptive systems that we feel inspired to suggest 
that the human mind is a complex system and to develop a 
theory of the mind that is a human instantiation of 
Halloy’s theory (Halloy, 1998; Halloy and Whigham, 
2004). Thus the mechanisms underlying our theory 
honour Halloy’s description of the behaviour of agents 
and particles in complex systems. We describe Halloy’s 
theory in detail and then follow this with a presentation of 
The Component Theory of Skill Acquisition that assumes 
the mind is a complex system. 
2.1. Halloy’s Resource Attraction Theory 
 According to Halloy, all complex systems possess a 
range of characteristics that give rise to similar statistical 
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relationships. Four important concepts in Halloy’s 
resource attraction theory are those of resources, 
particles, agents and boundaries.  
 “Resources (are) anything for which agents may 
compete…Particles are the minimum units of resources. 
From an agent’s viewpoint they are discrete packages of 
resources of variable size or ‘mass’. Particles are 
analogous to individuals in a biological population, to 
quanta of light or space in a plant community, to 
particles of dust in the cosmos, or to economic 
elements…Agents arise when an initial undifferentiated 
mass of particles breaks up or coalesces (i.e., boundaries 
are formed) into a number of parts. Each agent contains 
or controls a number of particles. Agents are analogous 
to species or companies…Boundaries are formed where 
interactions are proportionally more important between 
the particles inside the agent than they are between 
them and particles outside. The same applies for 
boundaries between systems at a higher level. 
Boundaries fluctuate and have a certain degree of 
permeability.” (Halloy, 1998, p.3). 
 “Complex adaptive systems have been characterized 
as systems made up of interacting agents which use rules 
to maximize their survival…A unifying feature of such 
systems is that agents are “greedy”, i.e. they attract 
resources, as much resources as they can grab. However, 
in evolved systems this attraction may become remarkably 
subtle, with time delays and complicated strategic 
decisions to forego a resource here and now for one in the 
future and somewhere else. Since agents are greedy, they 
necessarily compete for resources. Hence possibly the 
primal feature of complex systems is greed (or more 
euphemistically, resource attraction) and competition as its 
secondary outcome. It is this resource attraction and 
competition which in turn determines the primary 
interactions between agents, as well as the adaptive nature 
of agents changing rules to outcompete others.” (Halloy 
and Whigham, 2004, p.4). 
 The competition for resources between agents in a 
complex system can result in the development of clusters 
of agents into larger agents or the splitting of large 
agents into smaller ones. The conditions under which 
these two outcomes occur are determined, in part, by the 
level of attraction between and amongst agents and 
particles in the system. This attraction is proportional to 
the existing resources of the agents (i.e., larger agents are 
more “attractive”) and inversely proportional to the 
difficulty in obtaining resources (i.e., agents are more 
likely to attract particles or to combine with other agents 
when it is easier to do so). 
 Two important outcomes of the competition for 
resources that Halloy and Whigham (2004) highlights 
are differentiation and adaptation of agents.  
 “(A)ll agents eventually reach a size where their 
growth is not practical within their infrastructure. At this 
point they split…into sibling or parent and offspring 
agents (e.g. bacteria splitting, plants sprouting new 
shoots…). Initially, as they are informationally almost 
identical, these siblings may be considered part of the 
growing agent. However, this split has set the stage for the 
drifting of information which leads to differentiation and 
diversification. As differentiation (inevitably) proceeds, 
the siblings become different agents separated by 
informational barriers and competing with each other. In 
biology this is known as speciation.” (p.5) 
 “(E)volving agents typically explore new pathways 
and opportunities to attract resources. This is a 
consequence of resource attraction as modified by 
differentiation. As they explore new state space and rules, 
some agents find more efficient ways to capture resources 
and survive, while others die off. This is the process of 
evolution and adaptation.” (p.6) 
  Halloy (1998) has demonstrated that complex systems 
with the features described above can evolve into systems 
with abundance distributions that tend to lognormal (i.e., a 
class of distributions of which Zipf’s law is a subset). That 
is, complex systems possess a small number of large agents, 
a large number of small agents and a smooth transition 
between these two extremes.  
 Lognormal abundance distributions have been 
observed throughout nature and indeed throughout a 
range of human affairs. For instance, Halloy and 
Whigham (2004) report that such distributions exist in 
“planet sizes, earthquakes, animal and plant sizes and 
abundances, sizes of firms, behaviour of the stock 
market, (and) traffic congestion.” (p.7). All of the 
situations in which such distributions have been 
observed constitute “networks of interacting things 
under non-equilibrium conditions” (Buchanan, 2000, 
p.16) and such systems are known as complex systems. 
Halloy’s theory represents an explanation for how such 
systems evolve and is general to all complex systems. 
Below we extend this ubiquity to human cognition and 
thereby suggest that the functioning of the mind follows 
universal laws of nature. 
3. THE COMPONENT THEORY OF 
SKILL ACQUISITION: THE MIND AS A 
COMPLEX SYSTEM 
 Up until now, we have referred to skilled behaviour 
as comprising the actions of many component processes. 
We have not been precise about the nature of these 
processes, but it has been sufficient to simply consider 
these as properties of the brain that carry out some form 
of information processing. Ultimately these component 
processes must be related to the functioning of neurons 
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in the brain, which essentially are processors of 
information. In order to develop a theory of skill 
acquisition that honours Halloy’s specification of a 
complex system we will define our component processes 
as consisting of agents. Certainly this is not a precise 
specification of component processes, but this lack of 
specificity actually reflects part of our argument, that the 
specification of component processes will depend on the 
level of analysis (more on this later).  
 The central tenet of the theory we are proposing - 
the Component Theory of Skill Acquisition - is that the 
human brain and therefore the human mind is a complex 
system. The agents in this complex system receive, 
process and transmit information. Depending on the level 
of analysis, these agents may be individual neurons, or 
networks of neurons, or even networks of networks. The 
degree to which consideration of these agents as 
networks of neurons will assist in understanding their 
function will also depend on the level of analysis. For 
example, developing an understanding of the processing 
of lines and edges in visual stimuli may rely on a focus 
on the performance of individual neurons, however it 
may be more sensible to explain the comprehension of 
written text by recourse to higher order agents that 
correspond to networks of neurons. Ultimately, though, 
an agent will only have utility by virtue of its input and 
output connections-that is, an agent must receive 
information and then pass it on once it has been 
processed. Thus all agents exist in networks with other 
agents. Furthermore, an agent will incorporate feedback 
mechanisms whereby the success or otherwise of the 
agent’s processing will determine the likelihood of that 
agent performing that processing in the future. Details of 
these feedback mechanisms are provided below.  
 For the brain to be considered a complex system, its 
agents must compete for some resource. In our view this 
resource is information, because it is a sine qua non for 
adaptation to the world. The fundamental drive of agents in 
the mind is to be used to process information. This feature 
of our theory mimics that of neural systems where the 
survival of connections between neurons depends upon 
regular activation (Bruer and Greenough, 2001; Latham-
Radocy and Radocy, 1996). In our model, agents compete 
to process information. If the outcome that results from the 
operation of an agent leads to success in achieving some 
goal, then the agent will be likely to be recruited for 
processing in the future. Thus success can lead to an 
increased potential for further success for an agent and 
hence continued survival. Failure, however, will lead to a 
reduced potential to be used in future and so possibly the 
demise of the agent. 
 Agents live or die on the basis of their usefulness. 
Firstly, they have to compete to be used. Secondly, if the 
result of their processing is successful, this then increases 
the chance of continued survival for the winning agent. 
This principle, then, suggests some fundamental drives of 
the mind. Early in life these drives will relate to survival. 
For example, if the products of an agent’s functioning in a 
particular situation lead to food, water, or warmth, then the 
feedback associated with these rewards ensures that the 
agent is used again in future when a similar situation is 
encountered and alternative agents are less likely to be 
recruited. Thus an infant can learn the utility of crying, 
calling for “mum” and saying “drink”. Similarly, social 
rewards can act as drivers for learning (e.g., if a particular 
facial feature leads to positive attention from people, 
repeat it; if uttering a certain sound leads to food, a toy, or 
affection, repeat it).  
 In complex systems, agents are usually referred to as 
growing in some sense as they attract further resources. 
The sense of growing, however, is dependent on the 
situation in which a complex system is being considered. 
In our complex system version of the mind, agents grow 
with use in the sense that, with success agents come to be 
recruited more often to perform a particular task and so 
they come to dominate processing. Agents will increase 
their chances of being recruited to perform a task 
through a number of mechanisms, including performing 
the task more efficiently than competing agents (see 
below), or forging connections with other agents. In 
other words, there will be an increase in the number of 
situations in which an agent is useful. There will be 
limits, however, on the extent to which forging 
connections with other agents leads to an increased 
usefulness-some connections will prove to be fruitless 
because the processing that the agents can do is not 
relevant for some tasks (e.g., for some infants, every 
animal is a “dog”, until that response regularly attracts 
no reinforcement). Thus, the nature of the environmental 
demands will shape the usefulness of an agent. 
 In addition to the success or otherwise of an agent’s 
actions, the competition between agents for the right to 
process information is decided by the speed with which 
the agents complete processing. In a similar vein to 
Logan’s (1988) Instance theory, the agent that completes 
the necessary processing in the shortest time will be the 
winner of the competition. That is, the fastest agent is 
most likely to be used in future. The products of the 
fastest agent are used and hence that agent receives 
“success” feedback. This feedback has the effect of 
making this agent more likely to be used in similar 
situations when they occur in the future. 
 The competition to be used that agents engage in can 
result in the combination of agents to form larger sized 
agents and also the splitting of large agents into smaller, 
more specific agents. The conditions under which these 
events occur will be associated with the particular task 
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presented to the complex system. The system will try to 
respond to any challenge that the environment presents 
and so the resulting agents will be a match for the 
environmental demands. If a challenge can be met by 
combining agents, then this will occur. If a particular 
environmental niche is detected that requires a more 
specific processing task than an existing general agent 
can complete, then a more specific agent may “break 
away” from the parent to exploit this opportunity to be 
used. Following Halloy and Whigham (2004), the 
competition to be used amongst agents results in a 
lognormal distribution of agents such that there will be a 
large number of small agents that have very specific 
purposes, a small number of general purpose agents and 
an inverse non-linear relationship between frequency and 
size for those agents between these extremes. 
 A concrete example of this type of system comes 
from issues surrounding word recognition. A general 
feature of skilled performance (Principle 5) is that 
sometimes it is useful to have skills that can solve 
problems in many situations and other times a more 
specific set of skills will be necessary. This feature is 
obvious in language skills. For instance, some English 
words are used in a broad range of situations (e.g., the) 
and others have a far more limited range of usefulness 
(e.g., hydrogen). That is, the word “the” can be used as 
the definite article for just about every noun in English 
and so is likely to appear in the majority of English 
sentences. The word “hydrogen”, in contrast, is likely to 
appear in sentences relating to chemical contexts. Thus 
the agent for processing “the” is used in more situations 
than the agent responsible for processing “hydrogen”. 
The “the” situations are not all going to be common-the 
situations in which “the” will occur are as varied as the 
topics of discourse, whereas the “hydrogen” situations 
are far more likely to have a common feature-that is, 
they will concern the element called hydrogen. The “the” 
agent is thus an extremely general agent that can be 
invoked in a number of situations whereas the 
“hydrogen” agent is only likely to be used in a small 
number of quite specific situations. There are very few 
words that are as ubiquitous as “the” (“a” and “I” are 
other examples), but there are thousands of words like 
“hydrogen” that appear in restricted contexts. In other 
words, there tend to be many more low frequency words 
than high frequency words. This distribution of words of 
course corresponds to Zipf’s law, which is a member of 
the lognormal family of abundance distributions. 
 There are many ways in which agents can improve 
their competitiveness for resources, or in other words, 
improve the likelihood of being used. To achieve this, 
agents must complete their processing in less time than 
competing agents. In our view, these improvements are 
the same as those we have highlighted with respect to the 
effects of practice on performance. That is, practice can 
lead to faster and more efficient forms of processing. We 
propose that there are many mechanisms whereby these 
changes can occur. For instance, agents may process 
information faster with repeated usage, a reflection of 
changes to neural function that have been observed to 
result from practice (Altmann et al., 2004; Barnes, 1979; 
Bolger and Schneider, 2002; Eccles, 1972). 
Alternatively, agents may combine with other agents in 
ways that reduce inefficient forms of processing (e.g., 
unnecessary processing steps can be skipped). Agents 
can also split if environmental demands suggest that a 
smaller agent with a more specific processing function 
will be more useful. The particular improvement strategy 
followed will be determined by the nature of the 
environmental challenge being tackled. Importantly, 
when a new challenge is encountered, there will be many 
potential means for improving the competitiveness of 
agents and so there will be greater potential for improved 
processing performance. As the challenge becomes more 
familiar, though, there will be less potential for 
improving further the competitiveness of agents and so 
performance improvements will be less likely. Thus 
performance changes over the course of practice will be 
negatively accelerated, which is evident in the 
characteristic shape of learning curves. Importantly, this 
negative acceleration characteristic is also a general 
feature of lognormal distributions in that it is relatively 
easy for an agent to shift from a rank of 1000 to a rank of 
990 (i.e., the proportional difference is low), compared to 
shifting from a rank of 10 to 1 (i.e., the proportional 
difference is many times larger).  
 A fundamental feature of our theory is that the 
likelihood of an agent being used in the future depends on 
the success of its processing. An important question, then, is 
by what mechanism does current performance affect future 
likelihood of use? In our theory this occurs as an inherent 
feature of the feedback process. We adopt the Kirsner and 
Dunn (1985) idea that every instance of processing results 
in a record of that processing. We suggest, however, that the 
record gets stored as part of the agent that performed the 
original processing, as a means of recording feedback of the 
results of the agent’s processing. When an agent completely 
fulfils the goals of its processing, a record is created that 
reflects the operations of the agent. This record then is a bit 
of information, a particle in Halloy’s terms, that is attracted 
to the agent and is thus stored as part of the agent. The 
effect of this process is that the agent grows. By growing in 
this manner, an agent becomes more attractive to future 
resources. That is, the agent is more likely to be used when 
faced with the same situation again. It is more likely to be 
used in future similar situations because its greater mass as 
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a result of successful past performance means it will be 
faster than other agents. In addition, a history of successful 
performance in a range of situations will increase the scope 
of applicability of an agent (see below). 
 The concept of an agent growing with successful 
application leading to an increased attractiveness is 
analogous to gravitational attraction. That is, in a 
physical system bodies with large mass possess greater 
gravitational attractiveness compared to bodies of 
smaller mass and so other bodies in the physical vicinity 
will be more attracted to and hence move toward the 
larger bodies. Similarly, in a complex system, the larger 
the mass of an agent, the greater the likelihood that it 
will attract particles in its region. In the mind, particles in 
the ‘region’ of an agent represent particles relevant to an 
agent’s processing. Therefore, when a demand is 
presented to the system, if two agents are of equal 
relevance to the demand, the agent with the greater mass 
will be more attractive to the particle that is up for grabs. 
That is, it will be more likely to complete the necessary 
processing and hence will collect the particle that 
represents the information about that processing episode. 
This particle will then add to the agent’s ability to attract 
further particles in future.  
 Although the gravitational analogy is a useful 
metaphor for understanding the nature of the 
competition for resources that occurs between agents, 
we can be more specific about the mechanism 
underlying the relationship between an agent’s 
successful processing and a subsequent increased 
likelihood of future recruitment. As stated above, 
particles in our theory represent processing records. 
But particles also enable future performance. That is, 
because they are a record for what worked in the past, 
they can function as a blueprint for what to do when 
that previous situation re-occurs. As a result, an agent 
that has completed a processing task successfully on 
many occasions will have a collection of particles that 
represent records of each of these processing episodes. 
More precisely, an agent is really only a collection of 
particles and so this growing collection of particles 
represents the growing mass of the agent. The mass of an 
agent is basically a collection of records of what happened 
in the past when a particular demand occurred. 
Alternatively, these records can be seen as a series of 
instructions about what to do should that demand re-occur. 
 Describing agents as collections of particles raises 
the question of why a large collection of particles (i.e., 
an agent with large mass) gives rise to faster 
performance than a smaller collection of particles (i.e., 
an agent with smaller mass). To answer this question we 
again borrow from Logan’s (1988) Instance theory. 
Within an agent particles will differ in the speed with 
which they can be utilized as processing instructions. To 
explain why this is the case, consider Fig. 1. Both panels 
of this figure depict a finite number of particles (N = 20 
in both cases). Depending on the current goals, these 
particles may or may not represent useful forms of 
processing. Imagine that in both cases the X symbol 
represents the most relevant particle for the current goal. 
The other symbols represent particles that are less 
relevant to the current goal (i.e., solutions that are sub-
optimal). In the left panel there is not as extensive a 
history of X being useful as in the right panel. That is, 
there are more Xs on the right. If we then imagine that 
recruiting one of the particles as a guide for performing 
the next task is a random search through these spaces and 
that the search ends when an X is encountered, there is 
clearly a greater chance of finding an X in the right panel 
than in the left panel. Furthermore, an X will be located 
sooner in the right panel than in the left panel. In general, 
then, the speed with which a relevant particle can be 
located is going to be determined by the number of such 
particles present-the more particles there are, the sooner 
one can be found and recruited. The speed with which an 
agent can perform a task, then, will reflect the particle 
that enabled processing in the shortest time. As in the 
Instance theory, the distribution of processing speeds 
amongst the particles within an agent (i.e., the time to 
recruit a relevant particle) will be a Weibull distribution 
(which is also a member of the lognormal family of 
distributions) and so there will be a power function 
relationship between the number of particles making up 
an agent (i.e., the number of successful processing 
episodes) and the speed of the agent’s processing. Thus 
an agent is more likely to complete processing before 
other agents with less mass because it is more likely to 
have a relevant particle that can enable appropriate 
processing in a shorter time. Thus although it might be 
convenient to think of large agents as attracting a 
processing episode in their direction, it is more accurate 
to think of such agents as being the fastest to complete 
processing. An agent will dominate processing in the 
sense that it always does the job not so much because at 
some point it attains privileged status and so demands to 
do the processing, but more because it is simply the 
fastest to provide a processing result in a never-ending 
competition with other agents. 
 It is important to note that no two situations in the 
world are ever identical. Even reading the same word 
on a computer screen in identical formats on two 
occasions does not involve exactly the same situation 
because the contextual content of the person reading the 
word is slightly different from one moment in time to 
the next. Thus the human information processing 
system must be capable of tolerating differences in 
ostensibly similar stimuli in order to be able to identify 
them as such. Of course, there must also be limits on 
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this tolerance so that differences can be perceived. 
Certainly some neural tissue appears to be sensitive to 
stimulus differences. For example, there are neurons in 
the visual cortex that appear to be geared to recognising 
lines of a particular orientation (e.g., vertical), but 
which are still active in response to lines that do not 
match the ideal orientation (i.e., not completely 
upright). The extent of activation, however, is 
proportional to the extent to which the lines 
approximate the ideal orientation for those neurons 
(Hubel and Wiesel, 1962). 
 In Halloy’s (1998) and Halloy and Whigham (2004) 
theory, the probability of an agent attracting a resource is 
inversely related to the distance to the resource. We 
honor this principle in the cognitive context by proposing 
that the relevance of an agent to the current goal of 
processing, or the similarity between the current 
conditions and the normal conditions processed by the 
agent, determine the likelihood of the agent being used 
and thus attracting a particle reflecting success. In other 
words, similarity determines the likelihood of an agent 
gaining mass and as a result, the rate of change of 
performance speed (Shepard, 1987). 
 For instance, this issue arises when an agent 
produces results that do not completely match the goals 
of processing. This could happen, for example, when an 
agent is used in a slightly different situation to the one in 
which it was developed. This partial success will 
nonetheless be stored as a record of the agent’s 
processing. The record of the partial match will be stored 
with the agent and this will have two effects. Just as the 
storing of a record of complete success means an 
increase in the mass of the agent, a record of partial 
success will also increase the agent’s mass. The increase 
in mass in this situation, however, will be less than that 
following complete success. This recognises the fact that 
partial matches between old knowledge and new 
problems can result in partial transfer (Greig and 
Speelman, 1999; Palmeri, 1997). The mechanism 
underlying this effect borrows from an idea in Palmeri’s 
(1997) modification to Logan’s Instance theory. The 
speed with which a particle can be utilised in the 
processing of a new situation will be a function of the 
similarity between the particle and the processing 
demand-the greater the similarity, the faster the speed of 
processing. Thus, the increase in the effective mass of an 
agent-that is, that characteristic of an agent that reflects 
the speed with which it will complete processing-that 
comes from a partial match will be proportional to the 
degree to which the agent satisfies the environmental 
demand. The second effect of storing a record of partial 
success is that information about the different conditions 
in which the agent was at least partially successful is 
stored with the agent. This has the effect of expanding the 
conditions under which the agent is potentially useful. 
Thus partial success can increase the potential usefulness 
of an agent in two ways: It results in increasing the mass 
of an agent that is associated with faster and more reliable 
recruitment of the agent, although this will be tempered by 
the degree of similarity between the experiences 
embedded in the agent and any new situation and it also 
results in an increase in the conditions in which the agent 
is applicable and so broadens the range of situations in 
which the agent could be useful. 
 Dealing with environments in which there is 
stimulus variability will result in agents that record many 
instances of complete success in one circumstance and a 
series of partial successes in another circumstance. As a 
consequence such an agent will possess two different 
types of particles. Under these conditions, there may be 
sufficient advantage in this heterogeneous agent (i.e., an 
agent applicable to several situations) splitting so as to 
create a number of smaller homogeneous agents that are 
more specific to the particular environmental 
circumstances. The advantage that will provide the 
motivation to such a split will be that the more specific 
agents will more completely satisfy the environmental 
demands and hence will receive greater increases to their 
mass than under partial matching conditions. 
 There will, of course, be a trade-off between the 
extent to which an agent develops to match the 
environmental demands (i.e., maximum increases to 
mass) and the frequency with which the specific 
environmental demands occur. Sometimes an agent that 
can deal with many situations will remain heterogeneous 
because the various situations do not occur sufficiently 
regularly to warrant a splitting to create a more specific 
agent. That is, the partial increases to the agent’s mass 
that comes from partial matching will justify the 
continued existence of the agent in its current form, 
whereas a smaller agent that is specific to the particular 
situation will not be useful sufficiently often to justify its 
existence. There will be times, however, when particular 
situations will occur sufficiently regularly that the 
increases to the mass of a smaller, more specific agent 
adapted to that situation will justify its separate 
existence. (It is worth noting that the processes described 
in this paragraph are analogous to the processes of 
speciation in biological systems, as described for 
example in Mayr, 1963; Laurent, 1972). 
 There will also be times when the operations of an 
agent do not result in success. This can arise when an 
agent does not win the right to be used (e.g., another 
agent does the job, or no agent does the job and so the 
word is not understood). Alternatively, the agent does get 
to complete processing but the result does not constitute 
a successful outcome. 
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Fig. 1. Two hypothetical distributions of particles, where X represents the most relevant particle to the current processing goal 
 
For example, the agent’s output does not satisfy the goals 
of processing. In both cases the agent would not attract a 
particle that is the record of successful performance. As a 
result its performance goes unrewarded. In a sense this 
represents a situation of no change to the mass and hence 
status of the agent (although see below). However, this 
does not mean that the system remains the same and is 
unresponsive to failure. Such situations represent 
opportunities for other agents to prosper. The first 
situation is one where a competing agent wins the 
competition to perform because it completes processing 
faster than the other agent. If this winning agent 
continues to perform successfully then that agent will 
become the agent of choice in similar circumstances. In 
the second situation, where an agent produces a result 
that is ultimately unsuccessful, a demand on the system 
remains unsatisfied and so represents an opportunity for 
new agents to develop. Therefore, as a result of 
unsuccessful performance, due to performance being too 
slow or inappropriate, agents can effectively lose their 
preferred status as more successful agents take over 
performance of the task. It is important to note that 
competition between agents can result in successful agents 
emerging as dominant on the basis of success alone. There 
is no need to posit an explicit inhibition mechanism 
(although inhibition may or may not be necessary in neural 
implementations of a complex system of this sort).  
 The suggestion that the mass of an agent does not 
change following unsuccessful performance may explain 
why, under some circumstances, people persist with 
inappropriate behaviour beyond the point at which they 
learn of the inappropriateness of their behaviour. For 
example, in the Luchins’ water jar problem, following 
the development of a mental set to approach all problems 
with a particular solution, the majority of people persist 
with the unnecessarily complex solution after 
experiencing a problem that could only be solved with a 
simpler solution (Luchins, 1942). The complex system 
explanation for this observation is that until an 
alternative agent is developed that can complete 
successful processing faster than the original agent can 
complete its unsuccessful processing, the unsuccessful 
agent will persist in producing inappropriate behaviour. 
 As stated in Principle 1, practice on any task 
typically leads to better performance. Another feature of 
the relationship between practice and performance that is 
just as commonly observed is that a lack of practice leads 
to poorer performance. That is, if someone practices a 
task for a period of time, performance typically improves 
in both accuracy and speed, but if the person ceases 
practice for some time, their performance upon resuming 
the task is never as good as it was at the end of the 
previous performance period. Skills seem to suffer a 
form of decay such that if they are not used, something is 
lost and this results in poorer performance. Some skill 
acquisition theories build in a decay parameter to 
account for this observation (e.g., Anderson, 1982). In 
our view there are several reasons why such apparent 
decay of skills occurs. Firstly, the complex system that is 
the mind is implemented in a biological system. It will 
therefore require some form of neural resource to 
maintain any form of mental representation over time. 
There may then be a limit on the ability to maintain 
representations that have not recently been of use. Thus 
agents that are currently “top of the pops” as far as 
usefulness is concerned grow in mass and this may occur 
at the expense of other not currently useful agents. This 
suggests a principle of conservation of mass whereby a 
constant mass is shared amongst all agents, such that any 
growth in the mass of some agents that reflects current 
usefulness is matched by a distributed reduction in mass 
of all other, not currently useful, agents (an example of 
how this can be modelled by the resource attraction 
theory is shown in Halloy, 2001). Another means 
whereby the apparent decay of skills can come about is 
associated with the idea that higher level skills require 
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the co-ordination of many agents that each perform some 
sub-component of the task. If a task is not performed for 
some time, the agents underlying performance of the task 
may be useful in some other task. So, although the agents 
themselves may suffer no loss of mass due to inactivity, the 
connections between the agents that enables their co-
ordination to perform the original task may fade with lack 
of use. For example, a guitarist may work up a solo 
comprised of various riffs and licks for a particular song. 
After many years of performing the song the guitarist gets 
tired of the song and drops it from his repertoire. Following 
several years of playing other songs, in which all the riffs 
and licks from the deleted song appear, but in different 
orders and across different songs, he receives a request to 
play the old song. He will find that despite all of the riffs 
and licks remaining in his repertoire, co-coordinating them 
smoothly into the solo of the original song will not come 
easy. The first new performance of this old song is likely to 
be “clunky”, or at least not as effortless and elegant as the 
final performance in the original tenure of the song. 
 Elsewhere (Speelman and Kirsner, 2005) we 
introduced a Fluency Threshold as part of the 
Component Theory of Skill Acquisition. This threshold 
corresponds to the point at which someone has the ability 
to attempt a new task. Prior to this point, the component 
processes necessary to perform the task are not fluent 
enough to fit within the person’s resource constraints. 
Thus the demands of the task outweighed the available 
resources. At the Fluency Threshold, however, the 
component processes necessary to perform the task have 
been practiced to the extent that the resources required to 
perform the task do not exceed those available. In the 
complex system version of the component model, this 
Fluency Threshold can be understood in terms of the 
competition between agents to be used. As described 
already, agents with greater mass (i.e., more successful 
experience) have a greater chance of being recruited to 
perform a task than agents with less mass. There are 
several reasons for this. If an agent is too slow, another 
faster agent may win the right to be used (i.e., it produces 
a solution before the slower agent completes processing). 
In addition, the complex systems of the human mind 
exist in a dynamic world, where task demands include 
time constraints. A slow agent may not complete 
processing in time for the demands of the task and so the 
benefits of successful processing are not realised. As a 
result, no reinforcement for performance will be 
received. Thus, such small, ‘young’ agents are not 
reliably applied in certain circumstances to enable 
consistent performance. Reliability of application comes 
only with sufficient successful past application. When a 
novice attempts a task that requires the application of 
several component processes, that is, several agents, they 
will only be able to complete the overall task 
successfully when the necessary agents have grown to a 
sufficient extent that they can do their job reliably. If any 
agent is insufficiently large to be reliable, then a link in 
the chain of processing will be inconsistently performed 
and the overall task will not be completed successfully.  
 As someone gains experience in a particular domain, 
the agents responsible for performing components of a 
task will become faster and more reliable. That is, when 
necessary, they will more consistently do the required 
job successfully. Eventually the agents will meet the 
Fluency Threshold conditions for successful task 
performance. That is, the person will have sufficient 
mental resources available, in the form of a set of 
reliable agents, to attempt the new task.  
 With further successful practice on this task, the 
agents responsible for the task components are rewarded 
for acting in concert by being recruited as a team in 
future. Indeed, if several agents consistently operate in 
succession to complete a task, there may come a time 
when agents that occur later in the chain come to 
‘anticipate’ the point of their own application. Initially 
agents may only be sensitive to outputs of the agent that 
immediately precede them in the chain. It is possible, 
however, that with experience, agents later in a chain can 
become sensitive to outputs from agents earlier in the 
chain than those that immediately precede them. 
Eventually these later agents may become sensitive to 
the initiating conditions of the task so that these lead 
directly to the results of the final agents in the chain and 
so unnecessary processing steps can be eliminated. This 
form of learned anticipation is characteristic of all forms 
of learning, such as chains of associated conditioned 
stimuli leading to a conditioned response in classical 
conditioning, or the development of complex behaviour 
in operant conditioning and also the chunking of 
information that facilitates comprehension and memory 
in domains such as language and chess. Ultimately, then, 
a network of agents that enable performance of a 
particular task could potentially create a new, higher 
order agent that is adapted for performing this particular 
task. Furthermore, this higher order agent could then 
serve as a component agent on some other, even higher 
order task. Thus the processes involved at one level of 
the system occur at all levels of the system. 
4. HOW THE MIND AS A COMPLEX 
SYSTEM GIVES RISE TO THE FIVE 
PRINCIPLES OF SKILL ACQUISITION 
 In this section we consider the extent to which the 
Component Theory of Skill Acquisition can account for 
the five principles of skill acquisition without explicitly 
building them into the theory. In doing so we show how 
the principles can be explained in terms of the operation 
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of agents and particles. We show too that each principle 
can be understood as a by-product of the adaptations of 
the complex system that is the mind. When the system 
adapts to the environment, it will do so according to the 
characteristics of a complex system and the adaptations 
will then exhibit particular features that are consistent 
with the five principles. Hence the principles are 
emergent features of the adaptations of agents. 
4.1. Principle 1: Practice Leads to Faster 
Performance 
 Performance of most measurable behavioral tasks 
will involve the operation of several agents. Practice on 
such tasks leads to faster performance for several 
reasons. One is that individual agents process 
information faster with practice. As the number of times 
an agent completes processing increases, more particles 
representing records of these episodes will be stored with 
the agent. These particles enable future performance and 
so as the collection of particles increases in size, so too 
does the chance of recruiting a useful particle in less 
time. As a result, the speed with which an agent can 
complete its processing can increase with practice and 
this can lead to faster performance on a task. As 
mentioned in the previous section, though, the benefit to 
performance time of increased numbers of relevant 
particles diminishes as a power function of the number 
of particles (i.e., practice). Thus performance 
improvements on a task will be a negatively accelerated 
function of practice. In addition, performance of a task 
that involves the operation of several agents can get 
faster with practice as a result of changes to the 
particular agents involved in performing the task. That is, 
practice can lead to more efficient forms of processing as 
a result of redundant agents being dropped from 
processing. The opportunities for such improvements in 
efficiency are likely to be much greater early in practice 
compared to later and so improvements in performance 
time that result from this mechanism will also be a 
negatively accelerated function of practice.  
4.2. Principle 2: Practice Leads to Efficiencies in 
Knowledge Access 
 When completion of a task involves the operation of 
several agents, practice can lead to the individual agents 
processing information faster and redundant agents being 
dropped from processing. As a result, “super” agents can 
develop that are responsible for performing the task in 
fewer steps than the original set of agents. That is, one 
agent can do the job of several agents. Thus, with reading 
experience, several agents that are separately responsible 
for recognizing the individual letters of a word can be 
superseded by an agent that recognizes the whole word. 
4.3. Principle 3: Learning Leads to Less Demand 
on Working Memory 
 The idea that there are working memory constraints 
on the performance of a task is usually invoked when a 
task is attempted that seems to require more than someone 
is capable of performing. For instance a task may require 
someone to pay attention to more information than is 
apparently possible. An example of this would be 
someone who is learning a language and they are required 
to comprehend a number of sentences that include many 
unfamiliar words and that are spoken very quickly. 
Initially their ability to comprehend each word may be non 
existent or too slow to enable all of the information about 
each word to be integrated into some realization of the 
meaning of each sentence. With growing expertise with 
the particular language (i.e., they become familiar with 
more words and the speed with which they can access 
their knowledge of these words increases), their ability to 
process such sentences increases. That is, they can 
comprehend a sentence soon after it is uttered. In this type 
of situation, our theory would propose that initially the 
person does not possess agents for word recognition that 
are sufficiently reliable and fast as to enable 
comprehension of the utterances. Words keep being 
uttered without comprehension keeping up. Thus each 
sentence bypasses the listener. With practice, however, 
agents become very fast and reliable in their processing 
and so enable almost instantaneous processing of 
language. So, rather than a representation of a sentence 
needing to be retained in working memory for long 
periods until ‘young’ agents can process the words, ‘old’ 
agents are able to process the sentence quickly and so free 
up space in working memory.  
4.4. Principle 4: As expertise Increases, Fewer 
Mental Resources are Required to Perform a 
Particular Task, Enabling the Development 
of a Hierarchy of Skills. 
 Two things can happen when a set of agents are 
used consistently in the performance of a task: (1) each 
agent completes its specific task in less time; and (2) 
some agents may no longer contribute to the overall 
performance of the task because other agents take over 
their processing. Thus as the history of successful 
performance grows, agents develop in such a way as to 
perform the task in a faster and more efficient manner. 
Being able to complete processing quickly is an 
advantage particularly when performance is in the 
context of a dynamic task where time constraints exist. 
These time constraints will include things like the 
existence of an environmental threat (e.g., an oncoming 
car) that requires some evasive action be taken in some 
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minimum time, or two people engaged in conversation 
where boredom could result if the conversation does not 
proceed at some minimum rate, or a complex task that 
requires intermediate products of processing be stored 
(e.g., double digit multiplication) but storage of these 
products in memory is subject to decay over time. Thus 
there is often considerable motivation to perform a task 
faster, not the least of which is to overcome the 
constraints of a basic level of performance in the domain. 
This motivation will provide the impetus to develop 
agents that are specific to the particular task at hand 
rather than utilise agents that have been useful in 
previous contexts. Agents adapted to specific contexts 
will be more likely to perform a task in fewer steps than 
agents cobbled together from previous relevant 
experiences. Ultimately, specific agents may develop to 
the extent that they enable automatic performance of a 
task rather than the slow and ponderous performance 
associated with more general agents. Thus a certain 
environmental challenge will trigger an automatic 
response rather than a chain of processing steps that may 
or may not produce an appropriate response. Typically, 
however, there is also motivation to perform at greater than 
basic level performance. Developing agents that enable fast 
and automatic performance of the basic task will mean that 
there may now be time enough available to start attempting 
more complex forms of the task. Thus, as someone 
becomes more fluent at evading an environmental threat, 
such as getting off a road in time to avoid an oncoming car, 
then one may be able to attempt another desirable 
behaviour, such as learning to cross a highway.  
4.5. Principle 5: Mastery in a Domain Involves 
the Application of an Array of Component 
Processes, with Varying Degrees of 
Specificity to Tasks and Contexts 
 Sometimes agents will develop that are specific to a 
task and cannot be used in the performance of any other 
task. At other times, agents will develop that can be 
recruited in the performance of several tasks. The nature 
of a domain will determine the relative mix of these 
types of agents and therefore skills. That is, if a task 
environment is such that a particular job has to be 
completed in a particular way, then agents will develop 
that are highly specialized to perform that task. The 
existence of such highly specialized agents will be ensured 
by the continued demand from the environment for such 
processing. In contrast, a task environment that requires 
many different performance types in varying contexts 
demands a flexible set of skills. As a result, agents will 
develop that are smaller in scope, specific to finer grained 
details of the task, but be capable of being recruited by 
other agents in order to complete the overall task. Thus 
performance in such a varying domain is unlikely to reach 
the automatic level of the more constrained environment, 
but is likely to be more flexible.  
 Another way to express Principle 5 is that people are 
sensitive to regularities in a task environment. The skills 
they develop to perform the task and their ability to 
transfer these skills, are a reflection of their adaptation to 
these regularities. Expressed in terms of the agent theory, 
this principle arises because the task environment 
determines the potential for particular types of agents to 
be used. Agents will develop to exploit opportunities and 
will do so in a manner that matches the peculiar 
requirements of that domain. As a result, the nature of 
the agents, in terms of whether or not they can be 
recruited to perform in other task environments will be 
determined by the nature of the task environment to 
which they originally adapted. 
 In sum, we have demonstrated that the five 
principles of skill acquisition all emerge from the 
adaptations of agents. Thus we have not had to build 
them into the fabric of the system, unlike other theories 
of skill acquisition (Speelman and Kirsner, 2005).  
5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 We have outlined here a theory of the mind as a 
complex system. This theory describes how experience 
with the world leads to the development of agents that 
enable performance of tasks necessary for dealing with 
challenges posed by the world. The theory is not a fully-
realised theory in the sense that computer simulations are 
possible based on the details we have sketched above 
(although Halloy (1998, 2001) has developed computer 
simulations of his model). The development of such a 
version of the theory is a task we have set ourselves for 
the future. Our main aim here, though, is to convince 
others of the importance of this task. In essence the 
theory we have presented here represents a claim that the 
contents of the mind are entirely a product of its 
interactions with the world. If we begin with this 
assumption, there are some enlightening implications for 
many areas of Psychology and for the entire discipline of 
Psychology. We outline one of these implications below 
(for other implications see Speelman and Kirsner, 2005).  
5.1. Skill Acquisition 
 For many years the one great constant about 
research in skill acquisition was that practice on a task 
led to performance improvements that followed a power 
function. This feature of skill acquisition is known as the 
power law of learning (Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981). 
As mentioned earlier, however, there has been 
controversy recently about whether or not learning 
curves are indeed best described by power functions and 
in fact whether or not the power law should actually have 
the status of a law. One conclusion that seems safe from 
recent discussions of this issue is that power function 
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learning curves are most often seen in group data, that is, 
data that is averaged over several individuals. Learning 
curves tend to be far less smooth in individual data, 
although there are instances where they do occur as 
smooth functions (Speelman, 1991). Therefore the power 
law seems only to apply in certain circumstances and 
hence begs the question about its lawfulness. How then 
can it be that a generalization applies under some 
circumstances, but under others it may or may not apply? 
 The Component Theory of Skill Acquisition implies 
a resolution of this issue. According to the theory, 
individual learning curves on tasks are a reflection of the 
improved performance of component processes (agents) 
throughout practice. Some agents will be newly created 
for the task and so will probably have a long way to 
improve. Other agents will be virtual modules in the 
sense that they are as good as they are ever going to get 
and so will not contribute to performance improvements 
on the task. The performance of some agents will 
improve with practice in a smooth manner, others will 
improve according to a step function and there are likely 
to be many variants in between these extremes. All 
agents, however, will need to improve to survive and 
there will be limits on the extent of improvement 
possible. Indeed some agents may have reached the 
extent of improvement (i.e., very old but useful agents) 
yet they will still need to continue to be useful to survive. 
The nature of the particular learning “curve” for each 
agent will be largely dependent on the particular 
processing engaged in. For instance, a task like counting 
is likely to be associated with a slow incremental 
improvement in performance that corresponds with a 
strengthening of number facts in memory (Aunola et al., 
2004). In contrast, a task such as Duncker’s Candle 
Problem would show a dramatic improvement in 
performance once a workable solution has been provided 
or is discovered. Thus different forms of processing 
involve different potentials for improvement and will 
therefore determine the nature of the improvement that 
can occur. Nonetheless, a task that involves the 
collaboration of teams of agents will typically show 
learning improvements that approximate a power 
function (i.e., are negatively accelerated and monotonic). 
This is because the averaging of several learning 
functions to create one omnibus learning function will 
always result in a power function (Haider and Frensch, 
2002; Heathcote et al., 2000; Murre and Chessa, 2011; 
Myung et al., 2000). For the same reasons, smooth 
power functions will be more likely to be observed in the 
learning curves of groups of individuals than in 
individuals’ learning curves. Thus, rather than the power 
law being an all-encompassing law for all occasions, as 
envisioned by Newell and Rosenbloom (1981), it is 
probably more accurate to state that learning behaviour 
tends to a power function, with individual cases being 
highly subject to ‘noise’. That is, performance time will 
be a power function of practice when performance time 
data represents an averaging of performance times 
collected from groups of people, or component 
processes, that each improves individually with practice 
but not necessarily as a power function. When there is 
not substantial averaging of separate learning functions, 
then the power law will not apply. It is important to note, 
then, that the lawful aspect of the power law comes from 
the mathematical property of averaging several functions 
rather than from some property of the brain. This then 
frees our theory and any other theory of skill acquisition 
from the constraint that it must contain a learning 
mechanism that not only obeys the power law, but 
explains it. Our theory, in fact, can explain why power 
function learning is observed in some circumstances and 
not in others, without in fact having a learning 
mechanism that follows a power function exclusively. 
Learning curves reflect the rise and demise of agents in a 
complex system competing to perform a task and it is the 
ubiquitous properties of such systems that give rise to the 
regularities observed in learning. 
6. REFERENCES 
Adamic, L.A., 2000. Zipf, Power-laws and Pareto-a 
ranking tutorial.  
Adams, C., 2003. Passenger Injuries in Crashes in Western 
Australia, 1996-2000. Report to The Royal Automobile 
Club of WA (Inc), April 2003. (Summarised in Road 
Patrol Magazine, April/May 2003) 
Allard, F. and J.L. Stakes, 1991. Motor-Skill Experts in 
Sports, Dance and Other Domains. In: Toward a 
theory of expertise: Prospects and limits, Ericsson, 
K.A. and J. Smith, (Eds.). Cambridge University 
Press, New York, pp: 126-152. 
Allard, F. and N. Burnett, 1985. Skill in sport. Canadian 
J. Psychol., 39: 294-312. 
Altmann, C.F., A. Deubelius and Z. Kourtzi, 2004. Shape 
saliency modulates contextual processing in the human 
lateral occipital complex. J. Cognitive Neurosci., 16: 
794-804. DOI: 10.1162/089892904970825 
Anderson, J.R. and C. Lebiere, 1998. Atomic 
Components of Thought. 1st Edn., Routledge, 
Mahwah, ISBN-10: 0805828176, pp: 490. 
Anderson, J.R., 1982. Acquisition of cognitive skill. 
Psychol. Rev., 89: 369-406. DOI: 10.1037/0033-
295X.89.4.369 
Anderson, J.R., 1983. Retrieval of information from 
long-term memory. Science, 220: 25-30. DOI: 
10.1126/science.6828877 
Craig P. Speelman et al. / Current Research in Psychology 3 (1) (2012) 1-18 
 
17 Science Publications
 
CRP 
Anderson, J.R., C. Lebiere and M. Lovett, 1998. Performance. 
In: Atomic components of thought Anderson, J.R. and C. 
Lebiere (Eds.). Mahwah, NJ., Erlbaum. 
Aunola, K., E. Leskinen, M-K. Lerkkanen and J-E. Nurmi, 
2004. Developmental dynamics of math performance 
from preschool to grade 2. J. Educ. Psychol., 96: 699-
713. DOI: 10.1037/0022-0663.96.4.699 
Baddeley, A.D., 1990. Human Memory: Theory and 
Practice. 1st Edn., Psychology Press Ltd, ISBN-10: 
0863771335, pp: 528.  
Barnes, C.A., 1979. Memory deficits associated with 
senescence: A neurophysiological and behavioral 
study in the rat. J. Comparative Physiol., 93: 74-104. 
PMID: 221551 
Bolger, D.J. and W. Schneider, 2002. Representation of 
visual word forms in fMRI habituation paradigms. 
Proceedigs of the 43rd Annual Meeting of the 
Psychonomics Society, (PS’ 02), Kansas City, Missouri. 
Bruer, J.T. and W.T. Greenough, 2001. The Subtle 
Science of How Experience Affects the Brain. In: 
Critical Thinking About Critical Periods, Bailey Jr., 
D.B., J.T. Bruer, F.J. Symons and J.W. Lichtman 
(Eds). Paul H. Brooks Publishing Co. Baltimore, 
Maryland, pp: 209-232. 
Buchanan, M., 2000. Ubiquity. 1st Edn., Pheonix Orion 
Books, London.  
Chase, W.G. and H.A. Simon, 1973. The Mind’s Eye In 
Chess. In: Visual Information Processing, W.G. 
Chase (Ed.). Academic Press, New York.  
Crovitz, H.F., M.T. Harvey and S. McClanahan, 1981. 
Hidden memory: A rapid method for the study of 
amnesia using perceptual learning. Cortex, 17, 273-
278. PMID: 7285598 
Eccles, J.C., 1972. Possible Synaptic Mechanisms 
Subserving Learning. In: Brain and Human 
Behaviour. A.G. Karyman and J.C. Eccles (Eds.). 
Springer-Verlag, New York. 
Ericsson, K.A. and P.G. Polson, 1988. Memory for 
Restaurant Orders. In: The Nature of Expertise. 
M.T.H. Chi, R. Glaser and M.J. Farr (Eds.). 
Hillsdale, NJ., Erlbaum. 
Greig, D. and C.P. Speelman, 1999. Is Skill Acquisition 
General or Specific? In: Perspectives on Cognitive 
Science: heories, Experiments and Foundations, 
Wiles, J. and T. Dartnall, (Eds.). Greenwood 
Publishing Group, Stamford, ISBN-10: 1567503829, 
pp: 171-190. 
Haider, H. and P.A. Frensch, 2002. Why aggregated 
learning follows the power law of practice when 
individual learning does not: Comment on Rickard 
(1997, 1999), Delaney et al. (1998) and Palmeri 
(1999). J. Exp. Psychol., Learn. Mem. Cogn., 28: 
392-406. PMID: 11911396 
Halloy, S.R.P. and B.I.P. Barratt, 2007. Patterns of 
abundance and morphology as indicators of ecosystem 
status: A meta-analysis. Ecol. Complexity, 4: 128-147. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2007.04.002 
Halloy, S.R.P. and P.A. Whigham, 2004. The lognormal 
as universal descriptor of unconstrained complex 
systems: a unifying theory for complexity. 
Proceedings of the 7th Asia-Pacific Complex 
Systems Conference, Cairns Convention Centre, 
Cairns, QLD, Australia, pp: 309-320. 
Halloy, S.R.P., 1998. A theoretical framework for 
abundance distributions in complex systems. 
Complexity Int., 6: 12-12. 
Halloy, S.R.P., 2001. Effects on system structure, 
diversity and stability of the distance exponent in a 
resource attraction model. Complexity Int., 8: 18-18. 
Heathcote, A.S., S. Brown and D.J.K. Mewhort, 2000. 
The power law repealed: The case for an 
exponential law of practice. Psychol. Bull. Rev., 7: 
185-207. PMID: 10909131 
Hubel, D.H. and T.N. Wiesel, 1962. Receptive fields, 
binocular interaction and functional architecture in 
the cat’s visual cortex. J. Physiol., 160: 106-154. 
PMID: 14449617 
Josephs, R.A., D.H. Silvera and R.B. Giesler, 1996. The 
learning curve as a metacognitive tool. J. Experimental 
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn., 22: 510-524.  
Kasparov, G., 1985. Learn Chess. 1st Edn., Redwood 
Books, London. 
Kirsner, K. and J.C. Dunn, 1985. The Perceptual Record: A 
Common Factor in Repetition Priming and Attribute 
Retention. In: Mechanisms of Attention: and 
Performance. M.I. Posner and O.S.M. Marin (Eds.). 
XI. Hillsdale, N.J., Lawrence Erlbaum. pp: 547-565. 
Larkin, J.H., 1983. The role of problem representation in 
physics. In: Mental models. D. Gentner and A.L. 
Stevens (Eds.). Hillsdale, NJ., Erlbaum. 
Latham-Radocy, W.B. and R.E. Radocy, 1996. Basic 
Physical and Psychoacoustical Processes. In: 
Handbook of Music Psychology, D.A. Hodges (Ed.). 
IMR Press, San Antonio. 
Laurent, R.F., 1972. La Especiacion. Miscelanea, pp: 44-
44. 
Le, Q.H., E.I. Sicilia-Garcia, J. Ming and F.J. Smith, 
2002. Extension of zipf’s law to words and 
phrases. Proceeding of the 19th International 
Conference on Computational Linguistics, Aug. 
24-Sept. 1, Howard International House and 
Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan. 
Craig P. Speelman et al. / Current Research in Psychology 3 (1) (2012) 1-18 
 
18 Science Publications
 
CRP 
Lesgold, A., R. Glaser, H. Rubinson, D. Klopfer and P. 
Feltovich, 1988. Expertise in a Complex Skill: 
Distinguishing X-Ray Pictures. In: The Nature of 
Expertise M.T.H. Chi, R. Glaser and M.J. Farr 
(Eds.). Hillsdale, NJ., Erlbaum. 
Logan, G.D., 1988. Toward an instance theory of 
automatization. Psychol. Rev., 95: 492-527.  
Luchins, A.S., 1942. Mechanization in problem 
solving: The effect of Einstellung Psychol. 
Monographs, 54: 1-95.  
Luscombe, N.M., J. Qian, Z. Zhang, T. Johnson and M. 
Gerstein, 2002. The dominance of the population by 
a selected few: Power-law behaviour applies to a 
wide variety of genomic properties. Genome Biol., 
3: 0040.1-0040.7. PMID: 12186647 
Mayr, E., 1963. Animal Species and Evolution. 1st Edn., 
Harvard University Press, Harvard. 
Miller, G.A., 1956. The magical number seven, plus or 
minus two: Some limits on our capacity for. 
Psychol. Rev., 63: 81-97. DOI: 10.1037/h0043158 
Murre, J.M.J. and A.G. Chessa, 2011. Power laws from 
individual differences in learning and forgetting: 
mathematical analyses. Psychon. Bull. Rev., 18: 
592-597. DOI: 10.3758/s13423-011-0076-y 
Myung, I.J., C. Kim and M.A. Pitt, 2000. Toward an 
explanation of the power law artifact: Insights from 
response surface analysis. Mem. Cogn., 28: 832-
840. PMID: 10983457 
Newell, A. and P.S. Rosenbloom, 1981. Mechanisms of 
Skill Acquisition and the Law of Practice. MIT 
Press Cambridge, MA, USA., ISBN-10: 
0262680718, pp: 81-135.  
Newell, A., 1990. Unified theories of cognition. 1st Edn., 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, ISBN-
10: 0674921011, pp: 576.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Palmeri, T.J., 1997. Exemplar similarity and the 
development of automaticity. J. Experimental Psychol. 
Lear. Mem. Cogn., 23: 324-354. PMID: 9080007 
Pirolli, P.L. and J.R. Anderson, 1985. The role of 
practice in fact retrieval. J. Exp. Psychol. Learning, 
Mem. Cogn., 11: 136-153. DOI: 10.1037/0278-
7393.11.1.136 
Rosenbloom, P.S. and A. Newell, 1987. An Integrated 
Computational Model of Stimulus-Response 
Compatibility and Practice. In: The Psychology of 
Learning and Motivation, G.H. Bower (Ed.). 
Academic Press, San Diego, pp: 1-52. 
Shepard, R., 1987. Toward a universal law of 
generalization for psychological science. Science, 
237: 1317-1323. PMID: 3629243 
Speelman, C.P. and K. Kirsner, 2001. Predicting transfer 
from training performance. Acta Psychol., 108: 247-
281. PMID: 11693252 
Speelman, C.P. and K. Kirsner, 2005. Beyond the 
Learning Curve: The Construction of Mind. 1st 
Edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford, ISBN-10: 
0198508859, pp: 288.  
Speelman, C.P., 1991. Skill acquisition: Estimating the 
contribution of old skills to performance on new tasks. 
University of Western Australia, Nedlands, Australia.  
Zipf, G.K., 1949. Human Behaviour and the Principle 
of Least Effort: An Introduction to Human 
Ecology. 1st Edn., Addison-Wesley Publishing, 
Cambridge, pp: 573. 
 
 
